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Abstract
False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting
game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among
these false identities. Analogously to this splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem
asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by
merging their weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or split-
ting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley–Shubik and the
normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10] for the probabilistic Banzhaf in-
dex. All these results provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving
the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley–Shubik and the probabilis-
tic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, “probabilistic polynomial
time,” and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the number of
false identities is fixed, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the
affirmative. It follows from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power
indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, which is considered
highly unlikely.
1 Introduction
Weighted voting games are an important class of succinctly representable, simple games. They can
be used to model cooperation among players in scenarios where each player is assigned a weight,
and a coalition of players wins if and only if their joint weight meets or exceeds a given quota. Typ-
ical real-world applications of weighted voting games include decision-making in legislative bodies
(e.g., parliamentary voting) and shareholder voting (see the book by Chalkiadakis et al. [CEW11] for
further concrete applications and literature pointers). In particular, the algorithmic and complexity-
theoretic properties of problems related to weighted voting have been studied in depth, see, e.g., the
work of Elkind et al. [ECJ08, EGGW09], Bachrach et al. [BEM+09], Zuckerman et al. [ZFBE08],
and [CEW11] for an overview.
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Bachrach and Elkind [BE08] were the first to study false-name manipulation in weighted voting
games: Is it possible for a player to increase her power by splitting into several players and dis-
tributing her weight among these false identities? Relatedly, is it possible for two or more players
to increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights? The most promi-
nent measures of a player’s power, or influence, in a weighted voting game are the Shapley–Shubik
and Banzhaf power indices. Merging and extending the results of [BE08] and [AP09], Aziz et
al. [ABEP11] in particular study the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted
voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley–Shubik index [Sha53, SS54] and the normalized
Banzhaf index [Ban65] (see Section 2 for formal definitions). Rey and Rothe [RR10] extend this
study for the probabilistic Banzhaf index proposed by Dubey and Shapley [DS79]. All these results,
however, provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds. Aziz et al. [ABEP11, Remark 13 on p. 72]
note that “it is quite possible that our problems are not in NP” (and thus are not NP-complete). Fal-
iszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09] provide the best known upper bound for the beneficial merging
problem with respect to the Shapley–Shubik index: It is contained in the class PP, “probabilistic
polynomial time,” which is considered to be by far a larger class than NP, and they conjecture
that this problem is PP-complete. Rey and Rothe [RR10] observe that the same arguments give a
PP upper bound also for beneficial merging in terms of the probabilistic Banzhaf index, and they
conjecture PP-completeness as well.1
We resolve these conjectures in the affirmative by proving that beneficial merging and splitting
(for any fixed number of false identities) are PP-complete problems both for the Shapley–Shubik
and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. Beneficial splitting in general (i.e., for an unbounded number
of false identities) belongs to NPPP and is PP-hard for the same two indices. Thus, none of these
six problems can be in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to its first level, which is
considered highly unlikely.
2 Preliminaries
We will need the following concepts from cooperative game theory (see, e.g., the textbook by
Chalkiadakis et al. [CEW11]). A coalitional game with transferable utilities, G = (N,v), consists of
a set N = {1, . . . ,n} of players (or, synonymously, agents) and a coalitional function v : P(N)→R
with v( /0) = 0, where P(N) denotes the power set of N. G is monotonic if v(B) ≤ v(C) whenever
B ⊆C for coalitions B,C ⊆ N, and it is simple if it is monotonic and v : P(N)→ {0,1}, that is, v
maps each coalition C ⊆ N to a value that indicates whether C wins (i.e., v(C) = 1) or loses (i.e.,
v(C) = 0), where we require that the grand coalition N is always winning. The probabilistic Banzhaf
power index of a player i ∈ N in a simple game G (see [DS79]) is defined by
Banzhaf(G , i) = 1
2n−1 ∑C⊆Nr{i} (v(C∪{i})− v(C)) . (1)
Intuitively, this index measures the power of player i in terms of the probability such that i turns a
losing coalition C ⊆ Nr {i} into a winning coalition by joining it, and therefore is pivotal for the
1They also note that the same arguments cannot be transferred immediately to the corresponding problem for the
normalized Banzhaf index.
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success of C. (For comparison, the normalized Banzhaf index of i in G defined by Banzhaf [Ban65],
who rediscovered a notion originally introduced by Penrose [Pen46], is obtained by dividing the
raw Banzhaf index of i in G , which is the term ∑C⊆Nr{i} (v(C∪{i})− v(C)) in (1), not by 2n−1, but
by the sum of the raw Banzhaf indices of all players in G ; see [DS79, FM05, RR10] for a discussion
of the differences between these two power indices.)
Unlike the Banzhaf indices, the Shapley–Shubik index of i in G takes the order into account in
which players enter coalitions and is defined by
ShapleyShubik(G , i) = 1
n! ∑C⊆Nr{i}‖C‖! · (n−1−‖C‖)! · (v(C∪{i})− v(C)) .
Since the number of coalitions is exponential in the number of players, specifying coalitional games
by listing all values of their coalitional function would require exponential space. For algorithmic
purposes, however, it is important that these games can be represented succinctly. Simple games
can be compactly represented by weighted voting games. A weighted voting game (WVG) G =
(w1, . . . ,wn; q) consists of nonnegative integer weights wi, 1≤ i ≤ n, and a quota q, where wi is the
ith player’s weight. For each coalition C ⊆ N, letting w(C) denote ∑i∈C wi, C wins if w(C)≥ q, and
it loses otherwise. Requiring the quota to satisfy 0 < q ≤ w(N) ensures that the empty coalition
loses and the grand coalition wins. Weighted voting games have been intensely studied from a
computational complexity point of view (see, e.g., [ECJ08, EGGW09, BEM+09, ZFBE08] and
[CEW11, Chapter 4] for an overview).
Aziz et al. [ABEP11] introduce the merging and splitting operations for WVGs. We use the
following notation. Given a WVG G = (w1, . . . ,wn; q) and a nonempty2 coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n},
let G&S = (w(S),w j1 , . . . ,w jn−‖S‖ ; q) with { j1, . . . , jn−‖S‖} = Nr S denote the new WVG in which
the players in S have been merged into one new player of weight w(S). Similarly, given a WVG
G = (w1, . . . ,wn; q), a player i, and an integer m≥ 2, define the set of WVGs
Gi÷m = (w1, . . . ,wi−1,wi1 , . . . ,wim ,wi+1, . . . ,wn; q)
in which i with weight wi is split into m new players i1, . . . , im with weights wi1 , . . . ,wim such that
∑mj=1 wi j = wi. (Note that there is a set of such WVGs Gi÷m, since there might be several possibilities
of distributing i’s weight wi to the new players i1, . . . , im satisfying ∑mj=1 wi j =wi.) For a power index
PI, the beneficial merging and splitting problems are defined as follows.
PI-BENEFICIALMERGE
Given: A WVG G = (w1, . . . ,wn; q) and a nonempty coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}.
Question: Is it true that PI(G&S,1)> ∑i∈S PI(G , i)?
We distinguish between two splitting problems: In the first problem, the number m of false
identities some player splits into is not part of the given problem instance (rather, the problem itself
is parameterized by m), whereas m is given in the instance for the second problem. (This distinction
wouldn’t make sense for beneficial merging.)
2We omit the empty coalition, since this would slightly change the idea of the problem.
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PI-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT
Given: A WVG G = (w1, . . . ,wn; q) and a player i.
Question: Is it possible to split i into m new players i1, . . . , im with weights wi1 , . . . ,wim satisfying
∑mj=1 wi j = wi such that in this new WVG Gi÷m, it holds that ∑mj=1 PI(Gi÷m, i j)> PI(G , i)?
PI-BENEFICIALSPLIT
Given: A WVG G = (w1, . . . ,wn; q), a player i, and an integer m≥ 2.
Question: Is it possible to split i into m new players i1, . . . , im with weights wi1 , . . . ,wim satisfying
∑mj=1 wi j = wi such that in this new WVG Gi÷m, it holds that ∑mj=1 PI(Gi÷m, i j)> PI(G , i)?
The goal of this paper is to classify these problems in terms of their complexity for both the
Shapley–Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. We assume that the reader is familiar with the
basic complexity-theoretic concepts such as the complexity classes P and NP, the polynomial-time
many-one reducibility, denoted by ≤pm, and the notions of hardness and completeness with respect
to ≤pm (see, e.g., the textbook by Papadimitriou [Pap95]). Valiant [Val79] introduced #P as the class
of functions that give the number of solutions of the instances of NP problems. For a decision prob-
lem A ∈ NP, we denote this function by #A. For example, if SAT is the satisfiability problem from
propositional logic, then #SAT denotes the function mapping any boolean formula ϕ to the num-
ber of truth assignments satisfying ϕ . There are various notions of reducibility between functional
problems in #P (see [FH09] for an overview, literature pointers, and discussion). Here, we need
only the most restrictive one: We say a function f parsimoniously reduces to a function g if there
exists a polynomial-time computable function h such that for each input x, f (x) = g(h(x)). That is,
for functional problems f ,g ∈ #P, a parsimonious reduction h from f to g transfers each instance x
of f into an instance h(x) of g such that f (x) and g(h(x)) have the same number of solutions. We
say that g is #P-parsimonious-hard if every f ∈ #P parsimoniously reduces to g. We say that g is
#P-parsimonious-complete if g is in #P and #P-parsimonious-hard. It is known that, given a WVG
G and a player i, computing the raw Banzhaf index is #P-parsimonious-complete [PK90], whereas
computing the raw Shapley–Shubik index is not [FH09], although it, of course, is in #P as well.
Gill [Gil77] introduced the class PP (“probabilistic polynomial time”) that contains all decision
problems X for which there exist a function f ∈ #P and a polynomial p such that for all instances x,
x ∈ X if and only if f (x) ≥ 2p(|x|)−1. It is easy to see that NP ⊆ PP; in fact, PP is considered to
be by far a larger class than NP, due to Toda’s theorem [Tod91]: PP is at least as hard (in terms of
polynomial-time Turing reductions) as any problem in the polynomial hierarchy (i.e., PH ⊆ PPP).
NPPP, the second level of Wagner’s counting hierarchy [Wag86], is the class of problems solvable
by an NP machine with access to a PP oracle; Mundhenk et al. [MGLA00] identified NPPP-complete
problems related to finite-horizon Markov decision processes.
3 Beneficial Merging and Splitting is PP-Hard
In this section we prove that beneficial merging and splitting is PP-hard, and we provide matching
upper bounds for beneficial merging and splitting (for any fixed number of false identities) both for
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the Shapley–Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. We start with the latter.
3.1 The Probabilistic Banzhaf Power Index
We will use the following result due to Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09, Lemma 2.3].
Lemma 3.1 (Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09]) Let F be a #P-parsimonious-complete
function. The problem COMPARE-F = {(x,y) |F(x)> F(y)} is PP-complete.
The well-known NP-complete problem SUBSETSUM (which is a special variant of the KNAP-
SACK problem) asks, given a sequence (a1, . . . ,an) of positive integers and a positive integer q,
do there exist x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1} such that ∑ni=1 xiai = q? It is known that #SUBSETSUM is #P-
parsimonious-complete (see, e.g., the textbook by [Pap95] for parsimonious reductions from #3-SAT
via #EXACTCOVERBY3-SETS to #SUBSETSUM). Hence, by Lemma 3.1, we have the following.
Corollary 3.2 COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM is PP-complete.
Our goal is to ≤pm-reduce COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM to Banzhaf-BENE-FICIALMERGE. How-
ever, to make this reduction work, it will be useful to consider two restricted variants of COMPARE-
#SUBSETSUM, which we denote by COMPARE-#SUBSET-SUM-R and COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-
RR, show their PP-hardness, and then reduce COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR to the problem Banzhaf-
BENEFICIALMERGE. This will be done in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 and in Theorem 3.5. In all re-
stricted variants of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM we may assume, without loss of generality, that the
target value q in the related #SUBSETSUM instances ((a1, . . . ,an),q) satisfies 1≤ q≤ α−1, where
α = ∑ni=1 ai, such that #SUBSETSUM remains #P-parsimonious-complete.
COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R
Given: A sequence A = (a1, . . . ,an) of positive integers and two positive integers q1 and q2 with
1 ≤ q1,q2 ≤ α − 1, where α = ∑ni=1 ai.
Question: Is the number of subsequences of A summing up to q1 greater than the number of subse-
quences of A summing up to q2, that is, does it hold that #SUBSETSUM((a1, . . . ,an),q1) >
#SUBSETSUM((a1, . . . ,an),q2)?
Lemma 3.3 COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM≤pm COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R.
PROOF. Given an instance (X ,Y ) of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM, X = ((x1, . . . ,xm),qx) and Y =
((y1, . . . ,yn),qy), construct a COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R instance (A,q1,q2) as follows. Let α =
∑mi=1 xi and define A = (x1, . . . ,xm,2αy1, . . . ,2αyn), q1 = qx, and q2 = 2αqy. This construction can
obviously be achieved in polynomial time.
It holds that integers from A can only sum up to qx <α−1 if they do not contain multiples of 2α ,
thus #SUBSETSUM(A,q1) = #SUBSETSUM((x1, . . . ,xm),qx). On the other hand, q2 can only be ob-
tained by multiples of 2α , since ∑mi=1 xi = α is too small. Thus, it holds that #SUBSETSUM(A,q2) =
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#SUBSETSUM((y1, . . . ,yn),qy). It follows that (X ,Y ) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM if and only if
(A,q1,q2) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R. ❑
In order to perform the next step, we need to ensure that all integers in a COMPARE-#SUB-
SETSUM-R instance are divisible by 8. This can easily be achieved, since for a given instance
((a1, . . . ,an),q1,q2), we can multiply each integer by 8, obtaining ((8a1, . . . ,8an),8q1,8q2) with-
out changing the number of solutions for both related SUBSETSUM instances. Thus, from now
on, without loss of generality, we assume that for a given COMPARE-#SUBSET-SUM-R instance
((a1, . . . ,an),q1,q2), it holds that ai,q j ≡ 0 mod 8 for 1 ≤ i≤ n and j ∈ {1,2}.
Now, we consider our even more restricted variant of this problem.
COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR
Given: A sequence A = (a1, . . . ,an) of positive integers.
Question: Is the number of subsequences of A summing up to (α/2)− 2 greater than the number of
subsequences of A summing up to (α/2)− 1, i.e., #SUBSETSUM((a1, . . . ,an),(α/2)− 2) >
#SUBSETSUM((a1, . . . ,an),(α/2)− 1), where α = ∑ni=1 ai?
Lemma 3.4 COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R≤pm COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR.
PROOF. Given an instance (A,q1,q2) of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R, where we assume that A =
(a1, . . . ,an), q1, and q2 satisfy ai,q j ≡ 0 mod 8 for 1≤ i≤ n and j ∈ {1,2}, we construct an instance
B of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR as follows. (This reduction is inspired by the standard reduction
from SUBSETSUM to PARTITION due to Karp [Kar72].)
Letting α = ∑ni=1 ai, define
B = (a1, . . . ,an,2α −q1,2α +1−q2,2α +3+q1 +q2,3α).
This instance can obviously be constructed in polynomial time. Observe that
T =
(
n
∑
i=1
ai
)
+(2α −q1)+ (2α +1−q2)+ (2α +3+q1 +q2)+3α = 10α +4,
and therefore, (T/2)−2 = 5α and (T/2)−1 = 5α +1.
We show that (A,q1,q2) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R if and only if the constructed instance
B is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR.
First, we examine which subsequences of B sum up to 5α . Consider the following cases: If
3α is added, 2α +3+q1 +q2 cannot be added, as it would be too large. Also, 2α +1−q2 cannot
be added, leading to an odd sum. So, 2α − q1 has to be added, as the remaining α are too small.
Since 3α + 2α − q1 = 5α − q1, 5α can be achieved by adding some ai’s if and only if there exists
a subset A′ ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that ∑i∈A′ ai = q1 (i.e., A′ is a solution of the SUBSETSUM instance
(A,q1)). If 3α is not added, but 2α +3+q1 +q2, an even number can only be achieved by adding
2α +1−q1 such that α −4−q1 remain. So, 2α −q1 is too large, while no subsequence of A sums
up to α−4−q1, because of the assumption of divisibility by 8. If neither 3α nor 2α +3+q1 +q2
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are added, the remaining 5α +1−q1 −q2 are too small. Thus, the only possibility to obtain 5α is
to find a subsequence of A adding up to q1. Thus, #SUBSETSUM(A,q1) = #SUBSETSUM(B,5α).
Second, for similar reasons, a sum of 5α + 1 can only be achieved by adding 3α + (2α +
1− q2) and a term ∑i∈A′ ai, where A′ is a subset of {1, . . . ,n} such that ∑i∈A′ ai = q2. Hence,
#SUBSETSUM(A,q2) = #SUBSETSUM(B,5α +1).
Thus, the relation #SUBSETSUM(A,q1) > #SUBSETSUM(A,q2) holds if and only if #SUB-
textscsetsum(B,5α)> #SUBSETSUM(B,5α +1), which completes the proof. ❑
We now are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.5 Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE is PP-complete, even if only three players of equal
weight merge.
PROOF. Membership of Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE in PP has already been observed in [RR10,
Theorem 3]. It follows from the fact that the raw Banzhaf index is in #P and that #P is closed
under addition and multiplication by two,3 and, furthermore, since comparing the values of two
#P functions on two (possibly different) inputs reduces to a PP-complete problem. This technique
(which was proposed by Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09] and applies their Lemma 2.10)
works, since PP is closed under ≤pm -reducibility.
We show PP-hardness of Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE by means of a≤pm-reduction from COM-
PARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR, which is PP-hard by Corollary 3.2 via Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. Our construc-
tion is inspired by the NP-hardness results by Aziz et al. [AP09] and Rey and Rothe [RR10].
Given an instance A = (a1, . . . ,an) of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR, construct the following
instance for Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE. Let α = ∑ni=1 ai. Define the WVG
G = (2a1, . . . ,2an,1,1,1,1; α),
and let the merging coalition be S = {n+2,n+3,n+4}.
Letting N = {1, . . . ,n}, it holds that
Banzhaf(G ,n+2) = 1
2n+3
∥∥∥∥∥
{
C ⊆ {1, . . . ,n+1,n+3,n+4}
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈C wi = α −1
}∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n+3
(∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−1
}∥∥∥∥∥+3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ 1+ ∑i∈A′2ai = α−1
}∥∥∥∥∥ (2)
+3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ 2+ ∑i∈A′2ai = α−1
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ 3+ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α −1
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
(3)
=
1
2n+3
(
3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
,
3Again, note that this idea cannot be transferred straightforwardly to the normalized Banzhaf index, since in different
games the indices have possibly different denominators, not only different by a factor of some power of two, as is the
case for the probabilistic Banzhaf index.
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since the 2ai’s can only add up to an even number. The first of the four sets in (2) and (3) refers
to those coalitions that do not contain any of the players n+ 1, n+ 3, and n+ 4; the second, third,
and fourth set in (2) and (3) refers to those coalitions containing either one, two, or three of them,
respectively. Since they all have the same weight, players n+3 and n+4 have the same probabilistic
Banzhaf index as player n+2.
Furthermore, the new game after merging is G&{n+2,n+3,n+4} = (3,2a1, . . .2an,1; α) and, simi-
larly to above, the Banzhaf index of the first player is calculated as follows:
Banzhaf
(
G&{n+2,n+3,n+4},1
)
=
1
2n+1
∥∥∥∥∥
{
C ⊆ {2, . . . ,n+2}
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈C wi = α −1
}∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2n+1
(∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai ∈ {α −3,α−2,α −1}
}∥∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ 1+ ∑i∈A′ 2ai ∈ {α −3,α −2,α−1}
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
=
1
2n+1
(
2 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
.
Altogether, it holds that
Banzhaf
(
G&{n+2,n+3,n+4},1
)
− ∑
i∈{n+2,n+3,n+4}
Banzhaf(G , i)
=
1
2n+1
(
2 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
−
3
2n+3
(
3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α −2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α −4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
=
(
1
2n+1
·2−
3
2n+3
·3
)∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−2
}∥∥∥∥∥
+
(
1
2n+1
−
3
2n+3
)∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ 2ai = α−4
}∥∥∥∥∥
= −
1
2n+3
·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ ai =
α
2
−1
}∥∥∥∥∥+ 12n+3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈A′ ai =
α
2
−2
}∥∥∥∥∥ ,
which is greater than zero if and only if ‖{A′ ⊆ N | ∑i∈A′ ai = (α/2)− 2}‖ is greater than ‖{A′ ⊆
N | ∑i∈A′ ai = (α/2)− 1}‖, which in turn is the case if and only if the original instance A is in
COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. ❑
It is known (see [RR10]) that both the beneficial merging problem for a coalition S of size 2 and
the beneficial splitting problem for m = 2 false identities can trivially be decided in polynomial time
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for the probabilistic Banzhaf index, since the sum of power (in terms of this index) of two players is
always equal to the power of the player that is obtained by merging these two players. Analogously
to the proof of Theorem 3.5, it can be shown that the beneficial splitting problem for a fixed number
of at least three false identities is PP-complete.
Since we allow players with zero weight, we need another simple fact for the analysis of the
beneficial splitting problem to be used in the proofs of Theorems 3.7 and 3.10.
Lemma 3.6 For both the probabilistic Banzhaf index and the Shapley–Shubik index, given a weight-
ed voting game, adding a player with weight zero does not change the original players’ power
indices, and the new player’s power index is zero.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 is straightforward and therefore omitted. We are now ready to prove
Theorem 3.7, which states that Banzhaf-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-complete for each m≥ 3.
Theorem 3.7 Banzhaf-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-complete for each m ≥ 3.
PROOF. As already mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.5, comparing the values of two #P func-
tions on two (possibly different) inputs reduces to a PP-complete problem and thus is is in PP. In
particular, this is true for the problem of comparing (sums of) probabilistic Banzhaf indices in pos-
sibly different WVGs, such as testing whether the sum of the new players’ raw Banzhaf indices
is greater than 2m−1 times the raw Banzhaf index of the original player i (which is equivalent to
“∑mj=1 Banzhaf(Gi÷m, i j) > Banzhaf(G , i)” from the definition of Banzhaf-m-BENE-FICIALSPLIT),
where i is split into m new players i1, . . . , im.
The main difference between the beneficial merging and splitting problems is that before com-
paring the two #P functions associated with beneficial splitting, one has to choose a right way of
distributing i’s weight among the m false identities of i. Since m is fixed, there are only polynomially
many (specifically, some number in O(wmi )) ways of doing so, i.e., of finding nonnegative integers
wi1 , . . . ,wim satisfying ∑mj=1 wi j = wi. Thus, this comparison can be done in PP for each such weight
distribution. As PP is closed under union, Banzhaf-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is in PP.
In order to show PP-hardness for Banzhaf-3-BENEFICIALSPLIT, we use the same techniques as
in Theorem 3.5, appropriately modified.
First, we slightly change the definition of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR by switching (α/2)−
2 and (α/2)− 1. The problem (call it COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM- RR) of whether the number of
subsequences of a given sequence A of positive integers summing up to (α/2)− 1 is greater than
the number of subsequences of A summing up to (α/2)− 2, is PP-hard by the same proof as in
Lemma 3.4 with the roles of q1 and q2 exchanged.
Now, we reduce this problem to Banzhaf-3-BENEFICIALSPLIT by constructing the following
instance of the beneficial splitting problem from an instance A = (a1, . . . ,an) of the problem COM-
PARE-#SUBSETSUM- RR. Let G = (2a1, . . . ,2an,1,3; α), where α = ∑nj=1 a j, and let i = n+ 2 be
the player to be split. G is (apart from the order of players) equivalent to the game obtained by
merging in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Thus, letting N = {1, . . . ,n}, Banzhaf(G ,n+2) equals
1
2n+1
(
2 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′ 2a j = α −2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′2a j = α−4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
.
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Allowing players with weight zero, there are different possibilities to split player n+ 2 into
three players. By Lemma 3.6, splitting n+ 2 into one player with weight 3 and two others with
weight 0 is not beneficial. Likewise, splitting n+ 2 into two players with weights 1 and 2 and one
player with weight 0 is not beneficial, by Lemma 3.6 and since splitting into two players is not
beneficial (by the remark above Theorem 3.7). Thus, the only possibility left is splitting n+2 into
three players of weight 1 each. This corresponds to the original game in the proof of Theorem 3.5,
Gi÷3 = (2a1, . . . ,2an,1,1,1,1; α). Therefore,
Banzhaf(Gi÷3,n+2) = Banzhaf(Gi÷3,n+3) = Banzhaf(Gi÷3,n+4)
=
1
2n+3
(
3 ·
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′2a j = α−2
}∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′ 2a j = α −4
}∥∥∥∥∥
)
.
Altogether, as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the sum of the three new players’ probabilistic
Banzhaf indices minus the probabilistic Banzhaf index of the original player is greater than zero if
and only if ∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′ a j = (α/2)−1
}∥∥∥∥∥>
∥∥∥∥∥
{
A′ ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈A′ a j = (α/2)−2
}∥∥∥∥∥ ,
which is true if and only if A is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM- RR.
This result can be expanded to all m≥ 3 by splitting into additional players with weight 0. More
precisely, if m > 3, we consider the same game G as above and split into three players of weight 1
each and m− 3 players of weight 0 each. By Lemma 3.6, the sum of the m new players’ Banzhaf
power is equal to the combined Banzhaf power of the three players. Thus, PP-hardness holds by the
same arguments as above. ❑
On the other hand, a PP upper bound for the general beneficial splitting problem cannot be
shown in any straightforward way. Here, we can only show membership in NPPP, and we conjecture
that this problem is even complete for this class.
Theorem 3.8 Banzhaf-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-hard and belongs to NPPP.
PROOF. With m being part of the input, there are exponentially many possibilities to distribute the
split player’s weight to her false identities. Nondeterministically guessing such a distribution and
then, for each distribution guessed, asking a PP oracle to check in polynomial time whether their
combined Banzhaf power in the new game is greater than the original player’s Banzhaf power in the
original game, shows that Banzhaf-BENEFICIALSPLIT is in NPPP.
Since Banzhaf-3-BENEFICIALSPLIT is a special variant of the general problem Banzhaf-BENE-
FICIALSPLIT, PP-hardness is implied immediately by Theorem 3.7. ❑
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3.2 The Shapley–Shubik Power Index
In order to prove PP-hardness for the merging and splitting problems with respect to the Shapley–
Shubik index, we need to take a further step back.
EXACTCOVERBY3-SETS (X3C, for short) is another well-known NP-complete decision prob-
lem: Given a set B of size 3k and a family S of subsets of B that have size three each, does there
exist a subfamily S ′ of S such that B is exactly covered by S ′?
Theorem 3.9 ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIALMERGE is PP-complete, even if only two players of equal
weight merge.
PROOF. The PP upper bound, which has already been observed for two players in [FH09], can be
shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.5.
For proving the lower bound, observe that the size of a coalition a player is pivotal for is cru-
cial for determining the player’s Shapley–Shubik index. Pursuing the techniques of Faliszewski
and Hemaspaandra [FH09], we examine the problem COMPARE-#X3C, which is PP-complete
by Lemma 3.1. We will apply useful properties of X3C instances shown by Faliszewski and Hema-
spaandra [FH09, Lemma 2.7]: Every X3C instance (B′,S ′) can be transformed into an X3C in-
stance (B,S ), where ‖B‖= 3k and ‖S ‖ = n, that satisfies k/n = 2/3 without changing the number
of solutions, i.e., #X3C(B,S ) = #X3C(B′,S ′). Now, by the properties of the standard reduction
from X3C to SUBSETSUM (which in particular preserves the number of solutions, i.e., #X3C par-
simoniously reduces to #SUBSETSUM, as well as the “input size” n and the “solution size” k),
we can assume that in a given COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM instance each subsequence summing
up to the given integer q is of size 2n/3. Following the track of the reductions from COMPARE-
#SUBSETSUM via COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R to COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR in Lemmas 3.3
and 3.4, a solution A′ ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} to a given instance A = (a1, . . . ,an) of the latter problem (A′
satisfying either ∑i∈A′ ai = (α/2)− 2 or ∑i∈A′ ai = (α/2)− 1, where α = ∑ni=1 ai) can be assumed
to satisfy ‖A′‖ = k = (n+2)/3. Under this assumption, we show PP-hardness of ShapleyShubik-
BENEFICIALMERGE via a reduction from COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. Given such an instance,
we construct the WVG G = (a1, . . . ,an,1,1; α/2) and consider coalition S = {n+1,n+2}. Define
X = #SUBSETSUM(A,(α/2)− 1) and Y = #SUBSETSUM(A,(α/2)− 2). Letting N = {1, . . . ,n}, it
holds that
ShapleyShubik(G ,n+1) = ShapleyShubik(G ,n+2)
=
1
(n+2)!



 ∑C⊆N such that
∑
i∈C
ai=(α/2)−1
‖C‖!(n+1−‖C‖)!

+

 ∑C⊆N such that
∑
i∈C
ai=(α/2)−2
(‖C‖+1)!(n−‖C‖)!




=
1
(n+2)! (X · k!(n+1− k)!+Y · (k+1)!(n− k)!) .
Merging the players in S, we obtain G&S = (2,a1, . . . ,an; α/2). The Shapley–Shubik index of the
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new player in G&S is
ShapleyShubik(G&S,1) =
1
(n+1)! ∑C⊆N such that
∑
i∈C
ai∈{(α/2)−1,(α/2)−2}
‖C‖!(n−‖C‖)!
=
1
(n+1)! (X +Y) · (k+1)!(n− k)!.
All in all,
ShapleyShubik(G&S,1)− (ShapleyShubik(G ,n+1)+ShapleyShubik(G ,n+2))
=
(X +Y ) · (k+1)!(n− k)!
(n+1)!
−
2(X · k!(n+1− k)!+Y · (k+1)!(n− k)!)
(n+2)!
=
k!(n− k)!
(n+2)! (n−2k)(−X +Y ). (4)
Since we assumed that k = (n+2)/3 and we can also assume that n > 4 (because we added four
integers in the construction in the proof of Lemma 3.4), it holds that
n−2k = n−4
3
> 0.
Thus the term (4) is greater than zero if and only if Y is greater than X , which is true if and only if
A is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. ❑
Theorem 3.10 ShapleyShubik-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-complete for each m ≥ 2.
PROOF. PP membership can be shown analogously to the PP upper bound in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.7. PP-hardness can also be shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.7, appropriately
modified to use the arguments from the proof of Theorem 3.9 instead of those from the proof of
Theorem 3.5. ❑
Theorem 3.11 ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-hard and belongs to NPPP.
PROOF. The upper bound of NPPP holds due to analogous arguments as in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.8. Also, analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.8, since ShapleyShubik-2-BENEFICIAL-Split
is a special variant of the general ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIAL-SPLIT problem, PP-hardness is im-
plied immediately by Theorem 3.10. ❑
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4 Conclusions and Open Questions
Solving previous conjectures in the affirmative, we have pinpointed the precise complexity of the
beneficial merging problem in weighted voting games for the Shapley–Shubik and the probabilistic
Banzhaf index by showing that it is PP-complete. We have obtained the same result for beneficial
splitting (a.k.a. false-name manipulation) whenever the number of false identities a player splits
into is fixed. For an unbounded number of false identities, we raised the known lower bound from
NP-hardness to PP-hardness and showed that it is contained in NPPP. For this problem, it remains
open whether it can be shown to be complete for NPPP, a huge complexity class that by Toda’s the-
orem [Tod91] contains the entire polynomial hierarchy. NPPP is an interesting class, but somewhat
sparse in natural complete problems. The only (natural) NPPP-completeness results we are aware
of are due to Littman et al. [LGM98], who analyze a variant of the satisfiability problem and ques-
tions related to probabilistic planning, and due to Mundhenk et al. [MGLA00], who study problems
related to finite-horizon Markov decision processes.
Another interesting open question is whether our results can be transferred also to the beneficial
merging and splitting problems for the normalized Banzhaf index. Finally, it would be interesting
to know to which classes of simple games, other than weighted voting games, our results can be
extended.
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